Oppy on the Argument from Consciousness: A Rejoinder by Moreland, J. P.




Graham Oppy is not persuaded by my argument for God from 
consciousness (hereaft er, AC) (Moreland 2008; cf. Moreland 2009a, 
2009b; Oppy 2011). Th is is hardly surprising, coming from a man who, 
upon assessing the impact of the explosion of sophisticated literature 
in defense of theism over the past twenty-fi ve years, claims that the 
probability of theism is still so low as to approximate zero (Oppy: p. 195)! 
Oppy raises dozens of points against my views, and I cannot respond 
to all of them here. Instead, I shall limit my remarks to those I take to 
be central to the issues relevant to my main thesis. Accordingly, I shall 
respond to his criticisms of my presentation of three forms of AC, and 
interact with his claims about theism, consciousness and emergent 
chemical properties.
I. THREE FORMS OF AC
Oppy opines that we cannot argue from regular correlations of mental and 
physical states to theism by way of an inference to the best explanation. 
He supports this claim in two ways. First, to warrant such an inference, 
we need to factor in other theoretical virtues (e.g., the ontological, 
ideological and other costs of theistic explanation) and an assessment 
of how well theistic explanation comports with other well-established 
theories. Second, he says it is not clear just how theism does explain these 
correlations. He illustrates this problem with a thought experiment in 
which European explorers come to Australia, fi nd the locals in possession 
of advanced mathematical knowledge, and in an attempt to explain this 
possession, rest content with the following: “It is hardly surprising that 
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these abilities should exist in fi nite consciousness, since they already 
exist in an unembodied mind, viz. God” (Oppy: p. 194).
I have three responses to Oppy’s fi rst argument. First, it is just not true 
that successful inferences to the best explanation (IBEs) must have access 
to all the information he mentions before such an inference is warranted. 
If such were required, successful inferences to the best explanation could 
hardly ever be made because access to all, or even most, of such factors 
is seldom available. Instead, IBEs are oft en based on basic intuitions, 
e.g., tacit knowledge, of the relative fi ttingness/informativeness of two or 
more rival hypotheses and explanatory data. Attempts to formalize the 
psychology of discovery or the epistemology of justifi cation here have 
failed, yet IBEs are successfully done all the time. Oppy’s requirements 
are far too skeptical. Moreover, just because his intuitions about the 
theistic hypothesis and IBE are negative, it does not follow that they 
ought to be such or that others will not draw a diff erent conclusion. 
Indeed, one of the key factors in leading Anthony Flew from atheism 
to theism was precisely the inductive evidence, most likely in the form 
of an IBE, regarding fi nite consciousness and relevant facts concerning 
it (Flew 2007: pp. 124-32, 161-65, 173-83). I believe that as AC gets 
more widely discussed, Oppy’s form of extreme skepticism will not be 
prevalent, though I could be mistaken here.
Second, according to the leading expert on IBE—Peter Lipton—
when specifi c virtues—e.g., scope, unifi cation, simplicity, treatment of 
contrastive “why” questions—are employed to assess an IBE, they are 
directly relevant to the loveliness of the hypothesis (its ability to facilitate 
understanding of why the data obtain and remove our puzzlement 
about them), and not its overall likelihood (Lipton 2000). By contrast, 
the specifi c virtues listed by Oppy seem relevant to overall likelihood, 
not loveliness with respect to data alone, and, thus, they are most likely 
irrelevant to cases of IBE. Th is leads to my third point.
Oppy seems to confuse factors relevant to IBE with those relevant 
to an overall assessment of the worth of a hypothesis. It could easily be 
the case that one could off er a successful IBE for a hypothesis relative to 
a specifi c range of facts, while that same hypothesis was judged ultimately 
inadequate in light of all the factors relevant to its assessment. My project 
was the former, not the latter, and so even if theism is judged inferior to 
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naturalism in light of all the relevant considerations Oppy proff ers, AC 
could still be a successful IBE. 
What about Oppy’s second argument regarding the lack of clarity 
of theistic explanation of mental/physical correlations? In my book 
I develop two points relevant to theistic explanation in this regard. For 
one thing, on theism, the basic being exemplifi es mental properties, so 
the theist does not have the problem of getting something from nothing 
(the exemplifi cation of mental properties from the mere rearrangement 
of brute matter). If, in the beginning were the particles, you have 
a problem with the appearance of the mental in the fi rst place, a problem 
that numerous naturalists acknowledge. Th e theist is in no such pickle 
here. Second, I develop the details of personal explanation, and claim 
that it is within the motives, intentions, and causal powers of God to 
bring about mental states and their regular correlation with brain states.
Remember, it is not a central part of personal explanation, as opposed 
to, say, causal explanation in the hard sciences, to answer a “how” question 
regarding the means by which an agent brings about an end, especially 
when the agent’s act was a basic one, as the theist will claim regarding 
God’s action in creating and sustaining mental facts and associated 
correlations. Personal explanation follows its own inner logic, and it can 
hardly be faulted for being unclear by employing standards suitable to 
alternative models of explanation.
I have two things to say regarding Oppy’s thought experiment. First, his 
claim that it is a weak explanation to appeal to God’s faculties to explain, 
say, the existence of fi nite, e.g., mathematical abilities, is wrong. I cannot 
develop the point, but Th omas Nagel has acknowledged the problem 
here for the atheist, along with the availability of a theistic explanation 
of human reasoning abilities (Nagel 1997: pp. 128-33). Victor Reppert 
(Reppert 2009) and Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga 1993) have developed 
detailed defenses of this argument. Th ose defenses are hardly examples 
of a “low standard of good enough explanation.”
Second, Oppy confuses an explanation of the precise direction taken 
by a culture with regard to developed mental abilities (which would 
appeal to the history, practices, etc. of the people in question), given that 
basic abilities exist, with an explanation of how basic mental states and 
correlations could exist in the fi rst place. AC involves the latter and his 
thought experiment is simply irrelevant to that project.
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Oppy moves to a criticism of my C-inductive Bayesian version of AC. 
I shall briefl y respond to his specifi c criticisms, and then step back and 
say what I believe is the key issue in this form of the argument.
Regarding the prior probability of theism relative to consciousness 
(Pr(T)), I claim that it is higher than many naturalists think, and 
support my claim by citing the explosive growth for twenty-fi ve years of 
sophisticated defenses of theism of which many naturalists are unaware 
(I agree here with naturalist Quentin Smith; see Smith 2001). Oppy retorts 
that the history of philosophy is replete with sophisticated defenses of 
claims to which we now give little credence and, moreover, even in light 
of this literature, Pr(T) approximates zero.
I think Oppy’s remarks are uncharitable and unconvincing. Obviously, 
in a book with a specifi c focus on AC, I could not undertake to provide 
a thorough-going defense of theism. Instead, I cite the presence of a vast 
amount of relevant recent literature with which many naturalists are 
unfamiliar. I certainly don’t believe the mere existence of this literature 
establishes the truth of theism, and it is uncharitable to think otherwise. 
But it hardly follows that the plausibility of a viewpoint is not related to 
the volume and quality of defenses of that viewpoint. Th ink of what the 
epistemic situation would be if no one were defending theism and contrast 
that situation with the actual state of play. Surely the latter adds some 
support to theism. Moreover, my main point was that many naturalists 
working in the philosophy of mind (Oppy notwithstanding) take dismissive 
attitudes towards theism as though there were no sophisticated defenses 
of it. Th e widespread presence of such defenses makes such an attitude 
intellectually irresponsible, and that was, and is, my central point.
Regarding the probability of fi nite consciousness given theism 
(Pr(C/T)), I claim that (1) consciousness is exemplifi ed by the basic 
entity, given theism, so there is no problem with giving an account of 
where conscious properties could come from so as to be available for 
subsequent exemplifi cation, and (2) qua person, God would have 
reasons to create other conscious beings because persons are communal 
in nature and love to create other persons. Oppy replies that there are 
serious conceptual problems with the very idea of a disembodied mind 
and, moreover, “we all know people who are not interested in meaningful 
relationships with others and who have no desire at all to bring other 
people into being” (Oppy: p. 196).
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Th e fi rst claim strikes me as incredible. To make one point here, there 
is a vast and, in my view, convincing literature that disembodied existence 
is actual in near death experiences (See Long 2010). But what seems 
beyond reasonable doubt is that the vast majority of people, including 
educated people, rightly take these accounts as coherent and possibly 
true. Based on strong conceivability, from the fi rst-person perspective, 
there is no problem with the possibility of me continuing to exist with 
such a perspective without a body.
It is hard to take the second claim seriously. For one thing, it is 
surely more natural and probable that a person will want meaningful 
relationships (and children) than not; thus, upon meeting a new 
person, one is prima facie justifi ed in thinking these will be true of the 
person in question, unless an overriding defeater is discovered, and the 
same epistemic situation obtains in contemplating a possible person, 
including God. Further, if we note that the person in question is loving 
and generous, as is the case with God on the biblical conception, then it 
would be even more likely that such a person would desire meaningful 
relationships with others and to bring others into existence.
Next, Oppy responds to my following point: “[I]t is almost impossible 
for advocates of a naturalistic worldview to avoid admitting that these 
phenomena are explanatorily recalcitrant for them, and must be admitted 
as brute facts . . . And this is to admit that Pr(C/N) is very, very low 
indeed (Moreland: p. 34).” Here is Oppy’s response:
“We are supposing that ‘N’ is the claim that naturalism is true, and 
‘C’ is the claim that ‘conscious properties are regularly correlated with 
physical features’. What is the relationship between C and N? A natural 
thought, given Moreland’s characterization, is that N entails that it is 
a brute fact whether C. But if N entails that it is a brute fact whether 
C, then it is not the case that Pr(C/N) is very, very low unless it is also 
the case that Pr(C) is very, very low. Aft er all, N’s entailing that it is 
a brute fact whether C surely ensures that N and C are probabilistically 
independent. . . (Oppy: p. 196).”
In the broader context of my book, I think that my cited paragraph 
above is clear, but I admit that there is an ambiguity in my meaning if 
the paragraph is taken on its own, and I am happy to have the chance 
to clarify my point here. Oppy seems to be criticizing my claim that 
because N has no explanatory power with respect to C, then Pr (C/N) 
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is very low. Now Oppy is correct to point out that two propositions 
can be explanatorily independent without being improbable with 
respect to each other. However, key to Oppy’s criticism is his claim that 
“N’s entailing that it is a brute fact whether C surely ensures that N and 
C are probabilistically independent. . .” It would follow from this that 
it makes not the slightest diff erence to our expectation of C whether 
N is true or false, and throughout my book, I make clear that this is not 
my view.
In my book, I actually deny that N entails that C is a brute fact. Instead, 
I claim that for various reasons (e.g., N provides absolutely no resources 
for predicting or explaining C), Pr (C/N) approximates zero. Th us, N 
strongly suggests that C does not exist, and a reductive or eliminative 
strategy will be employed to support this claim. Th us, the probabilities of 
C and N are not independent. In the isolated paragraph above, by saying 
that naturalism must acknowledge mental phenomena as brute facts, 
I meant to underscore their bruteness—their utter inexplicability and, 
therefore, (likely) non-existence—not their factuality, though I admit my 
meaning was not clear.
In my book, I provide a number of reasons to think that naturalists 
should deny the existence of irreducible consciousness. I am far from 
alone in this judgment. In fact, many—indeed, most—naturalist 
philosophers of mind have been strict physicalists. On the eve of the 
demise of logical positivism and the analytical behaviorism it funded, 
one of the fathers of the resulting stream of physicalism, J. J. C. Smart, 
paradigmatically noted: “It seems to me that science is increasingly giving 
us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical 
mechanisms. . . . Th ere does seem to be, so far as science is concerned, 
nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical 
constituents. All except for one place: in consciousness . . . I just cannot 
believe that this can be so. Th at everything should be explicable in terms 
of physics . . . except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be 
frankly unbelieveable” (Smart 1959: p. 61). 
At this point, I want to step back from analyzing Oppy’s specifi c 
criticisms and make a general point about the central issue in a Bayesian 
form of AC. Recall that in the early days of emergentism in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, emergent properties were characterized 
epistemically, viz., as those which were unpredictable, even from a God’s-
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eye perspective, from a complete knowledge of the subvenient base. 
Th at subvenient base provided no explanatory or predictive grounds 
for emergent properties precisely as emergent entities. Now it makes no 
diff erence for the relevance of this point that today we construe emergent 
properties ontologically and not epistemically. Even on the ontological 
construal, emergent properties are completely sui generis relative to the 
entities and processes at the subvenient base. In this regard, the following 
characterization by Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong (2005: 
pp. 665-6) may be taken as canonical:
An emergent property of type E will appear only in physical systems achieving 
some specifi c threshold of organized complexity. From an empirical point 
of view, this threshold will be arbitrary, one that would not be anticipated 
by a theorist whose understanding of the world was derived from theories 
developed entirely from observations of physical systems below the requisite 
complexity. In optimal circumstances, such a theorist would come to 
recognize the locally determinative interactive dispositions of basic physical 
entities. Hidden from his view, however, would be the tendency . . . to 
generate an emergent state.
For these reasons, P(C/N&k) (where k is background knowledge) is so 
low as to approximate zero. In my book I show why it is question-begging 
and ad hoc for someone simply to label the existence of mental states (or 
their correlations with physical states) as a basic, naturalistic fact in need 
of no explanation.
Now consider the following:
P(T/C&k)   =   P(T) x P(C/T&k)
P(N/C&k)        P(N) P(C/N&k)
Th e key probability for AC is not the prior probability of theism (and, 
I assume, the ratio of which it is a part). A low prior probability of theism 
does not by itself undercut AC. Even if that probability is low, it could 
be off set by an extremely low P(C/N&k) which would, in turn, make the 
key ratio be P(C/T&k) over P(C/N&k). And that is what an advocate of 
AC should argue, for even if P(T) and P(C/T&k) are somewhat low, the 
really low factor is P(C/T&k) which, as I said above, approximates zero. 
And it is this probability that is crucial to the Bayesian version of AC.
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Finally, Oppy criticizes premises (1) and (5) of the deductive form 
of AC:
(1) Mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist. 
(5) Th e explanation for these correlations (between mental/physical 
state types) is either a personal explanation or a natural scientifi c 
explanation.
Taking these in reverse order, Oppy argues against (5) that the 
options are not exhaustive. Accordingly, he suggests that there are 
naturalist theories, currently opaque to our cognitive capacities, which 
will say that the correlation of physical properties to mental properties is 
metaphysically necessary and such theories are neither natural scientifi c 
nor personal.
Oppy does not specify which theories he has in mind, but given his 
general contours, I think that the views of Timothy O’Connor represent 
the best specifi cation of what Oppy has in mind. Briefl y, there are two 
aspects to O’Connor’s view. First, the causal powers of properties are 
essential aspects of those properties and, thus, belong to properties with 
an absolute, metaphysical necessity. Th e causal potentialities of a property 
are part of what constitutes the property’s identity (O’Connor 2000: 
pp. 70-71, 117-118). It is in this sense, that in the right circumstances, 
a subvenient property necessitates an emergent property. By way of 
application, properties constitutive of consciousness are emergent in this 
sense (O’Connor 2000: pp. 115-123). Second, according to O’Connor, 
if an emergent property is depicted in such a way as to be contingently 
linked to the base properties causing it to emerge, then apart from an 
appeal to God’s contingent choice that things be so and to God’s stable 
intention that they continue to be so, there will be no explanation for the 
link itself or its constancy (O’Connor 2000: pp. 70-71).
With this in mind, I have two responses to Oppy’s argument. First, 
I think it confuses an effi  cient causal explanation for the fact that some 
phenomenon obtains with an ontological analysis of emergence that does 
not remove the need for the former. Even if we grant some necessitation 
account such as O’Connor’s, we are still left  without an explanation as to 
why the causal underpinnings of emergent mental properties obtained 
as opposed to alternative physical conditions. And, it could be argued, 
the two rivals for explaining this fact would be a natural scientifi c and 
a personal one. To put the point diff erently, an emergent necessitation 
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account will, in some sense, “explain” why an emergent property obtains 
by analyzing it as being necessitated by its subvenient base. But that does 
not explain why the base itself obtained. So the necessitation account 
does not, by itself, justify setting aside the dilemma of effi  cient causal 
explanation between natural scientifi c and personal explanation.
Second, in spite of what Oppy claims, the connection between mental 
and physical properties is contingent and not metaphysically necessary. 
Jaegwon Kim has provided an analysis of the dialectical situation we have 
reached (Kim 2006: pp. 229-33). According to Kim, while not conclusive, 
a very substantial case can be raised against the emergent necessitation 
view based on widely shared, plausible, commonsense intuitions that do 
not depend epistemically on a prior commitment to dualism. By contrast, 
Kim says that the only considerations in favor of emergent necessitation 
might very well be accused of begging the question because they all seem 
to depend upon a prior commitment to physicalism. I leave to the reader 
to ponder this stage of the dialectic, but I believe that, given contingency, 
O’Connor’s remark about the need for theistic explanation here is right 
on target.
Regarding (1), I have little to say. I refer the reader to his rebuttal of 
my brief case for property/event dualism. I found it signifi cantly wanting. 
Further, one major goal of my book was to supply intellectual pressure 
for naturalists to deny (1) and embrace strict physicalism. For some, this 
will be a small price to pay. For what I believe will be a growing number 
of others, such a denial is too steep a price to pay, and it will favourably 
be seen as fodder for a reductio against naturalism.
II. GOD, CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHEMICAL EMERGENCE
Oppy seems to think that my account of emergent properties (“given 
his apparent assumption that anything beyond ‘structural constitution’ is 
emergent”) makes it likely that I am committed to chemical emergence 
relative to physics, and, given this, he asks why I do not consider chemical 
emergence, every bit as much as consciousness, a problem in need of 
a theistic explanation. Says Oppy, “I think that it is very hard to give 
a precise account on which the ‘emergence’ of consciousness from matter 
is more mysterious or surprising than the ‘emergence’ of the properties of 
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water from the properties of hydrogen and oxygen; at the very least, we 
are owed some further explanation of why it is that chemistry is not ‘sui 
generis, simple, intrinsically characterisable and new relative to [physics] 
(Oppy: p. 201).”
I off er three responses to Oppy’s remarks. First, he does not give us an 
example of chemical emergence and I am skeptical that there are such. 
While I am open to counter examples, I think all chemical properties 
are either additive sums of features at the micro-physical level or else 
structurally supervenient on micro-physics.
Second, let’s grant that there are chemically emergent properties. By 
their very nature, emergent properties are utterly novel, unpredictable and 
inexplicable in light of their subvenient base, and as a result, there are no 
grounds whatsoever for claiming that emergent properties are somehow 
necessitated by their bases. To be sure, we rightly have a Humean habit 
of expecting constant conjunction here based on past experience, but 
constant conjunction with respect to emergent and subvenient properties 
provides no grounds for thinking the former are necessitated by the latter. 
However, we do have grounds in the form of widespread, commonsense 
intuitions that the connection between emergent properties and their 
subvenient bases is contingent. I have already pointed this out with 
respect to mental properties, and since we do not have before us clear 
examples of chemical emergence, let us consider secondary qualities and, 
for the purposes of illustration, construe them as mind-independent, 
irreducible, emergent properties. In this case, it is quite easy, based on 
(defeasible) strong conceivability, to generate thought experiments in 
which an inversion of secondary qualities obtains. We are, then, prima 
facie justifi ed in believing such states of aff airs are metaphysically possible. 
Now recall Timothy O’Connor’s remark that if an emergent property is 
depicted in such a way as to be contingently linked to the base properties 
causing it to emerge, then apart from an appeal to God’s contingent 
choice that things be so and to God’s stable intention that they continue 
to be so, there will be no explanation for the link itself or its constancy. In 
this way, contrary to Oppy, I see no reason why a theistic argument from 
chemical emergence (if such there be) could not be plausibly advanced.
Th ird, let us grant for the sake of argument that a theistic argument 
from chemical emergence is not plausible. Oppy challenges me to provide 
an account of why conscious emergence, but not chemical emergence, 
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provides the basis of a theistic argument. To answer this, we need to 
step back a minute and consider the impact of the presence of a rival 
hypothesis on the evaluation of a hypothesis in question. An important 
factor in theory acceptance—scientifi c or otherwise—is whether or not 
a specifi c paradigm has a rival. If not, then certain epistemic activities, e. 
g., labelling some phenomenon as basic for which only a description and 
not an explanation is needed, may be quite adequate not to impede the 
theory in question. But the adequacy of those same activities can change 
dramatically if a suffi  cient rival position is present.
Th e types of entities postulated, along with the sorts of properties 
they possess and the relations they enter should be at home with other 
entities in the theory, and, in this sense, be natural for the theory. Some 
entity (particular thing, process, property, or relation) e is natural for 
a theory T just in case either e is a central, core entity of T or e bears 
a relevant similarity to central, core entities in e’s category within T. If 
e is in a category such as substance, force, property, event, relation, or 
cause, e should bear a relevant similarity to other entities of T in that 
category. Th is is a formal defi nition and the material content given to it 
will depend on the theory in question.
Moreover, given rivals R and S, the postulation of e in R is ad hoc and 
question-begging against advocates of S if e bears a relevant similarity to 
the appropriate entities in S, and in this sense is “at home” in S, but fails 
to bear this relevant similarity to the appropriate entities in R. Th e notion 
of “being ad hoc” is notoriously diffi  cult to specify precisely. It is usually 
characterized as an intellectually inappropriate adjustment of a theory 
whose sole epistemic justifi cation is to save the theory from falsifi cation. 
Such an adjustment involves adding a new supposition to a theory not 
already implied by its other features. In the context of evaluating rivals 
R and S, the principle just mentioned provides a suffi  cient condition for 
the postulation of e to be ad hoc and question-begging. 
Th e issue of naturalness is relevant to theory assessment between 
rivals in that it provides a criterion for advocates of a theory to claim 
that their rivals have begged the question against them or adjusted their 
theory in an inappropriate, ad hoc way. And though this need not be 
the case, naturalness can be related to basicality in this way: Naturalness 
can provide a means of deciding the relative merits of accepting theory 
R, which depicts phenomenon e as basic, vs. embracing S, which takes 
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e to be explainable in more basic terms. If e is natural in S but not in 
R, it will be diffi  cult for advocates of R to justify the bald assertion that 
e is basic in R and that all proponents of R need to do is describe e and 
correlate it with other phenomena in R as opposed to explaining e. Such 
a claim by advocates of R will be even more problematic if S provides an 
explanation for e.
Now conscious properties are basic for theism in a way that (alleged) 
emergent chemical properties are not in that the former and not the latter 
characterize the fundamental, core entity in a theistic paradigm. Th ere 
is no need for a theist to account for the origin of consciousness per se 
since he takes consciousness to be basic. And the fact that consciousness 
appears in world history, is at home given theism in a way that chemical 
properties are not. Th is is why there are additional grounds for using 
the former in a theistic argument that fail to be present regarding the 
explanation of chemical emergent properties.
III. CONCLUSION
As I mentioned in the introduction, it is hardly surprising that Oppy is 
not persuaded by my presentation of AC, since he seems to be a hard 
person to persuade in general. Th e explosion of literature on behalf of 
theism in the last few decades has not moved him to consider Pr(T) as 
much higher than zero. He fl atly states in his review that “there is no 
such thing as libertarian freedom (Oppy: p. 200)”; he does not say that, 
on balance, compatibilism is to be preferred to libertarianism or that 
libertarianism is less plausible than compatibilism. Apparently, all the 
defenses of libertarian freedom have had little impact on his assessment 
of libertarianism.
I believe others will be more open to AC, especially those naturalists 
who acknowledge there is a serious problem here for naturalism. I have 
in mind those thinkers like Jaegwon Kim who (1) are sensitive to the hard 
problem of consciousness and, relatedly, to emergentist questions (e.g., 
Why does pain instead of pleasure or no conscious property at all correlate 
with C fi ber fi ring?) (Kim 2006: pp. 220-36, 282-305.), (2) accept certain 
emergent mental properties (those of phenomenal consciousness for 
Kim), and (3) recognize the limits of naturalistic explanation. Regarding 
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(3), Kim observes that “if a whole system of phenomena that are prima 
facie not among basic physical phenomena resists physical explanation, 
and especially if we don’t even know where or how to begin, it would be 
time to reexamine one’s physicalist commitments (Kim 1998: p. 96.)” For 
Kim, genuinely non-physical mental entities are the paradigm case of 
such a system of phenomena. And in this context, to abandon physicalist 
commitments is to abandon naturalist ones, or so I argue in my book.
I have tried to respond to what I take are the crucial criticisms Oppy 
advances against my thesis. Th ere are many criticisms he raises that 
I have not addressed. But life is short this side of the grave, and space is 
limited, so I must rest content with where things stand. I am honored to 
have someone of Oppy’s stature criticize my work, even though I cannot 
follow him in his views.1
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